pam-extra-1.3.0-6.50.1 >  A av~.p9|Vxnk[ UP"/jNrhYa`/7&HfZJݍµw=sNl^G7HXS!W3'uGEut{0JR]re א.q ɾ8)Ls\e*[)˽$?'b38qb łclI)idvj_Bnh 2P WjE#z*hnad2b74ea28b87ff2461d9bf3d125499730ae24474111d567277bd7e18dfbb6748951e10f471d2e81940dd973ed7efa799f1ceae2?Xav~.p9|S|ܛt90^xDbX!o8pVqG>e6"0%Lk. f:45Ik_;/ᯖcvfFL&a>TO.a/1 I,fɘHo ('~%M!_ő' ŷq~3";_{b9!ќU : q˜g8fv ii.5h3p^[K:"sҭ 4x6+-!][X{]M\@>p>#|?#ld   P )F`flt x |   $@Hh(:8D)9): )FG H I X Y $\ @] H^ fb c!5d!e!f!l!u!v!w"x"y" z# ## #&#hCpam-extra1.3.06.50.1PAM module to authenticate against a separate databasePAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is a system security tool that allows system administrators to set authentication policies without having to recompile programs that do authentication. This package contains useful extra modules eg pam_userdb which is used to verify a username/password pair against values stored in a Berkeley DB database.av~s390zp36?USUSE Linux Enterprise 15SUSE LLC GPL-2.0+ or BSD-3-Clausehttps://www.suse.com/System/Libraries%descriptionhttp://www.linux-pam.org/linuxs390x8H 큤av~av~85866d38c9c1c5c7b135ca370f5828d4a1671bcdeb92feb8d4b250cadfe0d5ccd371f0183b5864afb2e3fd2599e44fbfb783734a1b7466078d530edf176e8e46rootrootrootrootpam-1.3.0-6.50.1.src.rpmpam-extrapam-extra(s390-64)@@@@@@@@@@    libc.so.6()(64bit)libc.so.6(GLIBC_2.2)(64bit)libc.so.6(GLIBC_2.4)(64bit)libc.so.6(GLIBC_2.8)(64bit)libcrypt.so.1()(64bit)libcrypt.so.1(GLIBC_2.2)(64bit)libdb-4.8.so()(64bit)libpam.so.0()(64bit)libpam.so.0(LIBPAM_1.0)(64bit)libpam.so.0(LIBPAM_EXTENSION_1.0)(64bit)rpmlib(CompressedFileNames)rpmlib(FileDigests)rpmlib(PayloadFilesHavePrefix)rpmlib(PayloadIsXz)3.0.4-14.6.0-14.0-15.2-14.14.1aqV@aha]a/k@a&0`q`lM@`H`!'`_^@_ _u@_9^t@^ku^O@[[;@ZZ@ZYY@X6@XIK@W@WW'A@W!@W@W VbVbVn@V@Uz@U>U>$TTTjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.commeissner@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comfvogt@suse.comschwab@suse.dejosef.moellers@suse.comjosef.moellers@suse.comdevelop7@develop7.infokukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dejoschibrauchle@gmx.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.dekukuk@suse.debwiedemann@suse.com- Corrected a bad directive file which resulted in the "securetty" file to be installed as "macros.pam". [pam.spec]- Added tmpfiles for pam to set up directory for pam_faillock. [pam.conf]- Corrected macros.pam entry for %_pam_moduledir Cleanup in pam.spec: * Replaced all references to ${_lib}/security in pam.spec by %{_pam_moduledir} * Removed definition of (unused) "amdir".- Added new file macros.pam on request of systemd. [bsc#1190052, macros.pam]- Added pam_faillock to the set of modules. [jsc#sle-20638, pam-sle20638-add-pam_faillock.patch]- In the 32-bit compatibility package for 64-bit architectures, require "systemd-32bit" to be also installed as it contains pam_systemd.so for 32 bit applications. [bsc#1185562, baselibs.conf]- If "LOCAL" is configured in access.conf, and a login attempt from a remote host is made, pam_access tries to resolve "LOCAL" as a hostname and logs a failure. Checking explicitly for "LOCAL" and rejecting access in this case resolves this issue. [bsc#1184358, bsc1184358-prevent-LOCAL-from-being-resolved.patch]- pam_limits: "unlimited" is not a legitimate value for "nofile" (see setrlimit(2)). So, when "nofile" is set to one of the "unlimited" values, it is set to the contents of "/proc/sys/fs/nr_open" instead. Also changed the manpage of pam_limits to express this. [bsc#1181443, pam-bsc1181443-make-nofile-unlimited-mean-nr_open.patch]- Add a definition for pamdir to pam.spec So that a proper contents of macros.pam can be constructed. [pam.spec]- Create macros.pam with definition of %_pamdir so packages which are commonly shared between Factory and SLE can use this macro [pam.spec]- pam_cracklib: added code to check whether the password contains a substring of of the user's name of at least characters length in some form. This is enabled by the new parameter "usersubstr=" See https://github.com/libpwquality/libpwquality/commit/bfef79dbe6aa525e9557bf4b0a61e6dde12749c4 [jsc#SLE-16719, jsc#SLE-16720, pam-pam_cracklib-add-usersubstr.patch]- pam_xauth.c: do not free() a string which has been (successfully) passed to putenv(). [bsc#1177858, pam-bsc1177858-dont-free-environment-string.patch]- Initialize pam_unix pam_sm_acct_mgmt() local variable "daysleft" to avoid spurious (and misleading) Warning: your password will expire in ... days. fixed upstream with commit db6b293046a [bsc#1178727, pam-bsc1178727-initialize-daysleft.patch]- /usr/bin/xauth chokes on the old user's $HOME being on an NFS file system. Run /usr/bin/xauth using the old user's uid/gid Patch courtesy of Dr. Werner Fink. [bsc#1174593, pam-xauth_ownership.patch]- Moved pam_userdb to a separate package pam-extra. [bsc#1166510, pam.spec]- disable libdb usage and pam_userdb again, as this causes some license conflicts. (bsc#1166510)- Add libdb as build-time dependency to enable pam_userdb module. Enable pam_userdb.so [jsc#sle-7258, bsc#1164562, pam.spec]- When comparing an incoming IP address with an entry in access.conf that only specified a single host (ie no netmask), the incoming IP address was used rather than the IP address from access.conf, effectively comparing the incoming address with itself. (Also fixed a small typo while I was at it) [bsc#1115640, use-correct-IP-address.patch, CVE-2018-17953]- Remove limits for nproc from /etc/security/limits.conf ie remove pam-limit-nproc.patch [bsc#1110700, pam-limit-nproc.patch]- pam_umask.8 needed to be patched as well. [bsc#1089884, pam-fix-config-order-in-manpage.patch]- Changed order of configuration files to reflect actual code. [bsc#1089884, pam-fix-config-order-in-manpage.patch]- Use %license (boo#1082318)- Prerequire group(shadow), user(root)- Allow symbolic hostnames in access.conf file. [pam-hostnames-in-access_conf.patch, boo#1019866]- Increased nproc limits for non-privileged users to 4069/16384. Removed limits for "root". [pam-limit-nproc.patch, bsc#1012494, bsc#1013706]- pam-limit-nproc.patch: increased process limit to help Chrome/Chromuim users with really lots of tabs. New limit gets closer to UserTasksMax parameter in logind.conf- Add doc directory to filelist.- Remove obsolete README.pam_tally [bsc#977973]- Update Linux-PAM to version 1.3.0 - Rediff encryption_method_nis.diff - Link pam_unix against libtirpc and external libnsl to enable IPv6 support.- Add /sbin/unix2_chkpwd (moved from pam-modules)- Remove (since accepted upstream): - 0001-Remove-YP-dependencies-from-pam_access-they-were-nev.patch - 0002-Remove-enable-static-modules-option-and-support-from.patch - 0003-fix-nis-checks.patch - 0004-PAM_EXTERN-isn-t-needed-anymore-but-don-t-remove-it-.patch - 0005-Use-TI-RPC-functions-if-we-compile-and-link-against-.patch- Add 0005-Use-TI-RPC-functions-if-we-compile-and-link-against-.patch - Replace IPv4 only functions- Fix typo in common-account.pamd [bnc#959439]- Add 0004-PAM_EXTERN-isn-t-needed-anymore-but-don-t-remove-it-.patch - readd PAM_EXTERN for external PAM modules- Add 0001-Remove-YP-dependencies-from-pam_access-they-were-nev.patch - Add 0002-Remove-enable-static-modules-option-and-support-from.patch - Add 0003-fix-nis-checks.patch- Add folder /etc/security/limits.d as mentioned in 'man pam_limits'- Update to version 1.2.1 - security update for CVE-2015-3238- Update to version 1.2.0 - obsoletes Linux-PAM-git-20150109.diff- Re-add lost patch encryption_method_nis.diff [bnc#906660]- Update to current git: - Linux-PAM-git-20150109.diff replaces Linux-PAM-git-20140127.diff - obsoletes pam_loginuid-log_write_errors.diff - obsoletes pam_xauth-sigpipe.diff - obsoletes bug-870433_pam_timestamp-fix-directory-traversal.patch- increase process limit to 1200 to help chromium users with many tabss390zp36 16351556601.3.0-6.50.11.3.0-6.50.1pam_userdb.sopam_userdb.8.gz/lib64/security//usr/share/man/man8/-fmessage-length=0 -grecord-gcc-switches -O2 -Wall -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fstack-protector-strong -funwind-tables -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -fstack-clash-protection -gobs://build.suse.de/SUSE:Maintenance:21584/SUSE_SLE-15_Update/656e57c318fc0434a489407a785deb38-pam.SUSE_SLE-15_Updatecpioxz5s390x-suse-linuxELF 64-bit MSB shared object, IBM S/390, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, BuildID[sha1]=555d07272dcc80a1ea7581bbc4e063580e5a3271, strippedtroff or preprocessor input, ASCII text, with very long lines (gzip compressed data, max compression, from Unix) RR RRRRRRRR"%p[!utf-895edac3b6d93636bb500e4fabc4a738f350d0f43e3c2d077989557b77db05d2e? 7zXZ !t/@] crv9wu(C!m!O}?_|#9#bTWm{*eq=Of;$cXgʺF!T:mz|.מ8"`4+i_^B_sr O9䳪1qJX,lKx*e+NeY=B . 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